✦   ✦   ✦

breaking news

News, read through The Primal Race
← 全部评论 · all commentary

组阁算术里没有的那十九席The Nineteen Seats Missing From the Math

国际 结构层 · 文化层 Al Jazeera ↗ 2026-11-01 § 链接
新闻摘要以色列10月27日议会选举后,内塔尼亚胡阵营获53席,反内塔尼亚胡的犹太政党阵营获48席,阿拉伯政党获19席,均未达到120席议会中的61席多数。总统赫尔佐格须在11月11日前指定一名议员组建政府,该议员有28天时间,可延长14天。
The newsAfter Israel's October 27 election, Netanyahu's bloc won 53 seats, the opposing Jewish parties bloc 48 and Arab-led parties 19, all short of the 61-seat majority in the 120-seat Knesset. President Herzog must tap a lawmaker to form a government by November 11, with 28 days plus a possible 14-day extension.
阿拉伯政党握着十九席,却被默认不算数。
Arab parties hold 19 seats and are still counted as zero.

以色列大选的结果很清楚:内塔尼亚胡阵营 53 席,反内塔尼亚胡的犹太政党阵营 48 席,阿拉伯政党领导的阵营 19 席,而组阁需要 61 席。三个阵营谁都不够。于是接下来几周的全部戏码,就是看谁跟谁凑出那 8 席、13 席的差额。

但请注意这份报道自己写下的那句话:反内塔尼亚胡阵营的领导人此前已经排除与阿拉伯政党合作。也就是说,在以色列的组阁算术里,19 个席位在投票日当天是有效的,在谈判桌上却要先被划掉,然后才轮到讨论“谁有希望组阁”。这不是某一次选举的意外,这是把一整个群体预先排除在“可合作对象”之外,再宣布他们不参与决定国家走向——结构暴力最典型的样子:没有人下命令,规则自己就把人筛掉了。

报道里唯一把这个矛盾说破的,是公民组织 Zazim 的联合创始人 Raluca Ganea,她说反对派阵营和代表以色列巴勒斯坦公民的阿拉伯政党联合,是“以色列民主整体唯一的出路”。而前总理巴拉克的说法更直接:如果内塔尼亚胡处在同样的位置,他会立刻请 Ra’am 的领导人曼苏尔·阿巴斯入阁,给他内政部长的位子。这句话不是在夸内塔尼亚胡,是在说:排除阿拉伯政党的那条线,从来不是原则,是成本核算——对某些人来说成本可以付,对另一些人来说付不起,因为付了就要向自己的选民解释。

阿巴斯本人已经表示,艾森科特的条件对他的党不构成障碍;Joint List 的 Yousef Jabareen 说他的党准备好“赶走内塔尼亚胡政府”,并强调改变要通过“犹太与阿拉伯的真正平等伙伴关系”。这两句话在报道里各占一段,读起来像是善意。但它们同时暴露了另一件事:这 19 席能提供的,主要是让别人上台的票数,而不是自己进入决策的位子。外部支持、信任投票、少数政府——这些词在整篇报道里反复出现,指向的都是同一种安排:阿拉伯政党可以决定谁执政,但不能决定执政做什么。

再看程序。赫尔佐格必须在 11 月 11 日前指定一位议员组阁,被指定者有 28 天,可延长 14 天;失败后第二个人有 28 天,第三个人 14 天;都失败就解散议会,90 天内重选。这套时间表精密得像钟表,却完全没有为“19 席被系统性排除”这个问题留出任何一格。报道说,如果进程拖下去,内塔尼亚胡会以看守总理身份继续掌权数月,哪怕他最终进不了下一届执政联盟。一个人可以在明确输掉多数之后继续治理国家,因为规则只规定了谁能组阁,没规定谁必须离开。

赫尔佐格呼吁政客们放下僵硬的党派立场,寻找“有创意的解决方案”。创意这个词在这里很妙:真正需要的创意不是把 53 加 48 再加 19 凑到 61,而是承认那 19 席从一开始就不该被当成需要“创意”才能纳入的剩余项。报道没有写任何一个阿拉伯政党领导人被正式咨询组阁,也没有写他们的政策诉求被列入任何一份谈判清单。谁的名字没出现在谈判桌上,比谁出现在上面更能说明这个国家的民主在给谁定价。

最后那 90 天重选的条款,是这套算术的兜底:如果没人凑得出 61,就请全体选民再投一次,看看能不能投出一个不需要面对这 19 席的结果。选票可以重来,被排除的人不会因为重来而变得可被接受。

The Israeli election result is clean: Netanyahu's bloc took 53 seats, the bloc of Jewish parties opposing him took 48, Arab-led parties took 19, and forming a government takes 61. Nobody has it. The next few weeks are about who finds the 8 or 13 seats to close the gap.

But read what the report itself states: opposition leaders have previously ruled out partnering with the Arab-led parties. So in Israel's coalition arithmetic, those 19 seats are valid on election day and struck out before negotiations begin. This is not an accident of one election. It is an entire population pre-emptively excluded from the category of "possible partner," followed by the announcement that they do not get to decide the country's direction. That is structural violence in its purest form: no one gives an order, the rules filter people out on their own.

The only voice in the report that names this contradiction is Raluca Ganea of the civil society group Zazim, who says a coalition between the opposition bloc and the Arab-led parties representing Palestinian citizens is "the only path forward for Israeli democracy as a whole." Former PM Ehud Barak puts it more bluntly: if Netanyahu were in their position, he would immediately invite Ra'am's Mansour Abbas in and "give him the role of a minister of interior." That line is not praise for Netanyahu. It says the line against Arab parties was never a principle but a cost calculation — some politicians can afford to pay it, others cannot, because paying means explaining it to their voters.

Abbas himself has signalled that Eisenkot's conditions would not obstruct his party. Yousef Jabareen of the Joint List says his party is ready for the "ousting of the Netanyahu government" and that change comes through "a true and equal partnership" between Jews and Arabs. Each gets a paragraph, and both read as goodwill. They also expose something else: what those 19 seats can supply is mostly the votes to put someone else in power, not a seat at the table where power is used. Outside support, confidence votes, minority government — the report keeps returning to these phrases, and they all describe the same arrangement: Arab parties may decide who governs, not what governing does.

Then the procedure. Herzog must tap a candidate by November 11; that candidate gets 28 days, extendable by 14. A second gets 28, a third gets 14. Fail all that and the Knesset dissolves, with new elections within 90 days. The timetable is precise as a clock and has not one slot for the problem of 19 seats being systematically excluded. The report notes that if the process drags on, Netanyahu stays on as caretaker prime minister for months, even if he ultimately fails to join the next coalition. A man can lose his majority outright and keep governing the country, because the rules specify who may form a government and never who must leave.

Herzog urges politicians to abandon rigid partisan stances and look for "creative solutions." Creative is the tell. The creativity actually needed is not 53 plus 48 plus 19 into 61; it is admitting those 19 seats should never have been the remainder requiring creativity to include. The report does not mention any Arab party leader being formally consulted on forming a government, nor any of their policy demands appearing on a negotiating list. Whose names are absent from the table says more about whom this democracy prices at zero than whose names are on it.

The 90-day re-election clause is the arithmetic's backstop: if no one reaches 61, ask the voters again and see whether they can produce a result that does not have to face those 19 seats. Votes can be redone. The excluded do not become acceptable by being voted on twice.